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Abstract Dr Felix Nobis is a senior lecturer with the Centre for Theatre 
and Performance at Monash University. He has worked as a professional 
actor for many years. He previously played an assistant to the Crown 
Prosecutor in the Australian television series, Janus, which was set in 
Melbourne, Victoria and based on the true story of a criminal family 
allegedly responsible for police shootings. He also played an advisor to a 
medical defence firm in the Australian television series MDA. He is a 
writer and professional storyteller. He has toured his one-person 
adaptation of Beowulf (2004) and one-person show Once Upon a 
Barstool (2006) internationally and has written on these experiences. His 
most recent work Boy Out of the Country (2016) is written in an 
Australian verse style and has just completed a tour of regional Victoria.  
Professor Gary Watt is an academic in the School of Law at the University 
of Warwick where his teaching includes advocacy and mooting. He also 
regularly leads rhetoric workshops at the Royal Shakespeare Company. 
He is the author of Dress, Law and Naked Truth (2013) and, most 
recently, Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament and Properties of 
Performance (2016), which explores rhetoric in law and theatre. He also 
co-wrote A Strange Eventful History, which he performed with Australian 
choral ensemble, The Song Company, to mark the 400th anniversary of 
Shakespeare’s death.  
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Law is often a feature of theatrical productions and it is has frequently 
been observed that legal proceedings are inherently theatrical in nature. 
The accompanying image of the former Liverpool Crown Court depicts 
the relationship between law and theatre visually. The image is taken 
from the vantage of the judge’s bench facing the back wall that is lined 
with ionic columns and a grey curtain behind which is a grand concert 
Peer review: This article 
has been subject to a 
double blind peer review 
process 
 
© Copyright: The 
Authors. This article is 
issued under the terms of 
the Creative Commons 
Attribution Non-
Commercial Share Alike 
License, which permits 
use and redistribution of 
the work provided that 
the original author and 
source are credited, the 
work is not used for 
commercial purposes and 
that any derivative works 
are made available under 
the same license terms.  
Exchanges : the Warwick Research Journal 
 
190 Mulcahy. Exchanges 2017 4(2), pp. 189-200 
 
hall. The courtroom and concert hall open up to one another, suggesting 
a symbiotic relationship between the spaces.  
This interview is an attempt to understand law’s performance and the 
performance of law through dialogue between an actor who has 
sometimes played lawyers and a law professor who has sometimes 
acted. The dialogue bridges the scholarly divide between the study of law 
and the study of theatre and performance, bringing new insights to law 
and performance.  
 
SM: I will kick off with the first question to Felix. Camryn Manheim who 
also played a lawyer on The Practice suggests that people's opinions 
about law are shaped as much by television as by reality (2012: 111). Do 
you agree and do you think this imposes some moral obligations on the 
actor? 
FN: I agree. In Australia, many of the views of the law are shaped by 
American television. There's an assumption for many people when they 
walk into the courtroom that it's going to be just like LA Law or that it's 
going to be just like a certain law programme and that the barrister can 
walk around and that they can shout ‘objection’ and things. There's 
strength and also an inherent risk in that. As far as the actor’s moral 
obligation, I honestly don’t think so. An actor's obligation is to learn the 
script and to understand the situation and to play her or his role in the 
bigger story being told by the writer and by the director and by the 
producer and the many people who are involved in putting together this 
kind of storytelling. The actor has an obligation to help tell that story and 
to help communicate the complexities inherent within that story. There 
may be a nuance there where the actor has as an obligation. But in the 
same way that in a medical drama playing a doctor I don't feel I have an 
obligation to the medical field, as an actor I couldn't say that there's a 
moral obligation beyond doing justice to the script as it's put together by 
the by the writer and the director. 
SM: Gary, you've suggested that, ‘It is sometimes said that courtroom 
lawyers are pretending to be actors in the theatre, but the truth is the 
other way around. Stage actors are pretending to be lawyers’ (2013: 
101). What do you mean by that? 
GW: The idea of a hearing to a live audience is one that goes back a long 
way in law, so far back that on the shield of Achilles as described by 
Homer there is a scene at the centre of lawyers debating in the public 
marketplace for each side of an argument for the prize of money. This 
shows us the very ancient tradition of disputing in a rhetorical way for a 
prize that was not just the prize of the issue at stake but also the prize of 
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audience approval and payment. Lawyers have been performing for pay 
and for applause, as it were, since the earliest times. The suggestion 
sometimes made that courtroom lawyers are pretending to be actors 
alludes to lawyers playing to the gallery or putting on a show as if that 
were something undignified. Lawyers ever since the Enlightenment and 
the scientific paradigm of medical practice have felt that the more 
theatrical or rhetorical aspects of their art were, in some sense, lacking in 
dignity. I want to suggest that lawyers shouldn't deny the rhetorical 
source of their art and that they might learn a great deal about the 
artistic reality of what they're doing if they were to acknowledge this 
rather than deny it. Conversely, the idea that stage actors are pretending 
to be lawyers is suggesting that part of what an actor is doing when 
they're on stage is trying to move the present audience – to some extent 
that's the people within the immediate space but it's also those people as 
representative of society at large. What actors want is to have a real 
impact, to have a real effect… on society of the sort that lawyers can 
claim.  
SM: You've previously written about how ‘insiders seem dead set in their 
denial of law’s imaginative dimension’ (2016: 2). Why do you think that 
lawyers and legal insiders want to deny law’s imaginative, its rhetorical 
and even its creative dimensions? 
GW: I think it is linked to the dominance of the post-Enlightenment 
professional paradigm, which is that of science and particularly medical 
science. Lawyers, as a group and professional entity, are keen to be 
considered on a par with medical doctors who have the respectability of 
a scientific basis for what they do and a reputation for surgical 
precision...  Lawyers also deny the art because of the lawyers’ reputation 
for dishonest artifice. Whereas if one takes the view that art is true and 
that law is socially real even though it is completely man-made, we can 
then acknowledge and accept the process of reality-making through art. 
That's certainly my approach to it. Lawyers as a profession are driven by 
the need to convince paying people that what they're offering is 
something certain and scientifically predictable. Of course, it's complete 
myth. Barristers only offer opinions; that's the nature of their advice, it’s 
always an opinion. Judges’ judgments may be reversed on appeal and 
then reinstated on subsequent higher appeal. So we've bought into this 
complete myth of the scientific predictability of law, whereas in fact it is 
art all the way through – the human actors in law aim for scientific 
precision and predictability but have to fail because of the contingency of 
what they’re doing.  
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SM: I might move on to talk about some of the performative dimensions 
of law. The first of which is around the question of voice in law... How do 
you think a study of voice, sound and rhetoric has helped shape your 
understanding of law or performance or both? 
FN: We ‘read’ people from their voice a great deal. One of the things that 
actors do is try to train their voice to sound convincing… because what 
actors are doing most of the time is telling somebody’s lie in the guise of 
truth. The cracks in that truth can become apparent through vocal 
performance… It’s a mystery to me that law even needs to still happen 
somehow, that it can't all be done by computer, that we can't just put all 
the information in and press a button. I’m joking of course, but it seems 
extraordinary to me that in this day and age we still have to all meet and 
listen to and perform for each other and that there is such a weight on 
such a flawed and manipulative thing as voice. The notion that justice is 
blind [suggests] we shouldn't be influenced by what we see visually, but 
there seems to be no suggestion that we shouldn't be influenced aurally. 
We are influenced aurally a great deal more than most of us are aware…  
GW: … There is something distinct about the word on the page and the 
word spoken. When I teach my student advocates how to speak well, I'm 
often emphasising the musicality of good speech and the moderation – 
indeed, the modulation – of the voice, which produces the sense of 
pleasing ease of speech. As a counterpoint to what Felix was saying 
about computerised or mechanised justice, we should acknowledge that 
the other thing people love their computers for nowadays, and their 
smart phones, is to listen to music. There is such a deep appeal to human 
wellbeing and the human psyche in pleasing sound… that I wonder if 
justice silenced would actually be justice lost, in that we wouldn't have 
our day in court, we wouldn't have our hearing, we wouldn't have the 
sense that our voice has been heard... There might be something 
absolutely essential to justice in society to having the sound heard. 
FN: Just to pick up from what Gary was saying, the musicality and the 
pleasure that we take from aurally receiving words or news is interesting 
but it doesn't necessarily correlate to truth, if something sounds pleasant 
it doesn't make it true. If the glove doesn’t fit, it doesn’t necessarily mean 
we must acquit… It's the same as when writing verse. When you find that 
magic rhyme, you find the rhythm, it just fits together and it's just right. 
That doesn't make it true. I've just written a play in verse and I know that 
sometimes the rhyme is too good to surrender so you change the story 
and the truth that’s being represented through the writing. But I think 
there is a truth in voice, that voice betrays us… [What actors are 
concerned] about is finding a connection between internal truth, what 
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we find to be true and the vocal delivery of that. That internal truth is a 
very different kind of truth to a socially constructed truth. 
SM: Gary, do you want to pick up on this question of truth – what is the 
truth that’s sought to be represented in law? 
GW: If we’re talking about law – I'm thinking here about the judicial 
process where you have two parties coming to court in an adversarial 
system with competing ideas of the truth, a judge accepting one of those 
accounts or producing a compromised third idea of truth, and the appeal 
court coming up with perhaps a fourth – we get the strong sense that the 
process isn't actually seeking any kind of truth that exists outside of the 
process. What we have, in fact, is a process that is designed to perform a 
satisfactory outcome. The process of a trial is to present and prove 
evidence and when that evidence can resist critique and probing we say 
that the trial has produced proof. It is not a process of revealing truth, 
but a process of manufacturing proof. Just as we might say that we have 
manufactured waterproof clothing when it satisfactorily resists the 
probing of rain. It is the fact that the proof produced by the process of 
trial is sufficient to deflect doubt that we call it a satisfactory outcome, it 
is not required that the outcome should also qualify as truth distinct from 
the truth inherent in the evidential process itself. Lawyers cannot and do 
not give the name of abstract or absolute truth to the outcome of a legal 
trial. It's a comfort to me that I don't have to claim that a legal trial 
produces truth – and it’s probably a comfort to practicing lawyers as well 
that they don't have to ascribe any abstract truth to what they're doing... 
It seems to me that if lawyers can acknowledge that what they're doing is 
performing proof rather than arguing for truth in an abstract way, they 
can get on with their job. This is not to say that lawyers should be 
unconcerned with morality, ethics and the aspiration for true justice, 
only that they should not rely upon the trial process to provide these 
things. 
SM: To go back to the performative dimensions in some more depth, 
you've written about how the body is connected to the voice and also to 
the movement within a space (2016: 1). How do you think lawyers 
connect their gesture and their movement with words? 
GW: I know from when I teach student advocates that we wrestle with 
the extent to which a lawyer should gesture and move within space. 
There are limited opportunities to do so in the course of a trial. You will 
approach your desk, you may move to the lectern, you might rearrange 
props such books, and use your spectacles as a prop to certain gestures; 
there are costume props such as the lawyer’s gown. I like to look at what 
lawyers are doing and to ask if even the smallest gestures might have 
significance. Silence is so much more eloquent than words very often. 
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Actors know that silence fills the performance space in a way that can 
hardly be attained by shouting. When you shout the sound immediately 
dies away, whereas silence gets louder and louder and louder the longer 
it lingers. It’s not emptiness, but a solid thing that demands our 
attention. Now if that's the case with silence and sound, what about 
small gestures? What if you are incredibly still? Theatrical actors know 
that this produces a cinematic close up effect and that if you actually 
minimise your bodily movement you’re drawing your viewer in to a tight 
focus of the sort that a cinematic camera might produce. Lawyers tend 
not to know any of these aspects of the actor’s art and yet some of them 
are doing it well instinctively and others not so well. What if one could be 
alert to this? As a jury, as a judge, as a lawyer, as an advocate, what if 
one had some awareness of how body and sound and movement may all 
relate to produce a combined rhetorical effect? 
SM: You brought up the point about silence and pause, which is an 
interesting device that actors use. Felix, do you have any thoughts on this 
idea of just what role silence or pause or the absence of voice plays in 
performance? 
FN: I think [silence] can speak, it can recalibrate the listener, it can give 
the listener opportunity to find themselves again within the story. That's 
incredibly valuable. It can also give an audience an opportunity to adjust 
and scratch if they've been holding on to a moment. Doing a long one 
person show of 60-70 minutes, it’s important to find those moments of 
allowing the audience to move or to cough if they've been holding that in 
for that long. It’s a matter of timing, tuning in to the audience and then 
finding a moment to pull back, maybe having a little cough yourself even 
if you don't need it, to just shake things up a little bit and break the 
tension which couldn't possibly hold that long. There's an element of 
orchestrating that suspension of tension and then pulling it back. Silence 
can often work as a tool like that.  
SM: The next dimension that I wanted to move on to talk about was dress 
in law and performance. Gary, having written a book about it, you've 
argued that the dress that lawyers wear operates both to deflect 
attention from their individual natures and their human qualities but also 
to generate a sense of reflection and introspection and to give lawyers 
cause to think about the ethical dilemmas inherent in their role (2013: ch 
4). To what degree do you think dress plays a constitutive role in law? 
GW: Dress plays a legislative role in society. It’s not just symbolic; it's 
constitutive of our social idea of order. The lawyer’s gown shields the 
lawyer and gives them a sense that they’re coming forward as a member 
of a profession and a group that owes its first duty to social order; not to 
the client but to the court and to justice. These are the founding 
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constitutive ideas of the legal professional: I stand here and the first 
thing you see is my gown because the first thing you should see is an 
officer of the court not a partisan representative of my client. There is 
that shielding effect; it allows a lawyer to come forward in role. The 
provocation I posed in my book on dress was: do lawyers sit too 
comfortably in this role and how much of the person gets lost in this 
role? We see sometimes that lawyers, even barristers, carry an invisible 
gown with them everywhere; they're still performing, they're still 
separate from the common run of humanity. But lawyers should always 
feel uncomfortable in the gown. They should wear it but the itchiness of 
the horsehair wig, the discomfort of the waistcoat, everything should 
conspire to make the lawyer think: I shouldn't feel comfortable here, I 
should be feeling that I'm doing a necessary but often dirty job. 
Therefore, as well as deflecting other people's critique, the gown should 
also serve to irritate your own person and you should be always 
questioning and conscious of that. That has to happen, otherwise lawyers 
get subsumed and become empty gowns. 
SM: Felix, having worn costumes before, what's the experience of putting 
on a costume like for you as an actor and how has the costume affected 
your performance in the role? 
FN: In Janus, I played an instructing solicitor not a barrister, so I was in a 
suit. More recently, in MDA, I was an adviser rather than a barrister. I 
was constantly amongst people in costumes. Gary makes an interesting 
point that an actor feels as well sometimes, that the costume emphasises 
the role but also works as a defence for the actor, works as an excuse for 
the actor to be acting in a certain way while also enhancing the 
character. They're two quite different things and yet they fit together 
very well. In a similar way, actors wear makeup if they’re appearing on 
stage or even on television. In one way that's for the lights and so that 
the audience sees them better, but there is something about being 
allowed to perform a certain way once the makeup is on and once the 
costume is on… Actors grow into costumes. So if you're turning up on set 
and you're performing for a day or two and you're wearing a costume, 
usually it's going to feel awkward and strange, usually it's got somebody 
else's name stitched into it – for me, it's usually Richard Roxburgh who’s 
worn that costume before me in something – but if it happens over a 
longer period, then you build a relationship with that costume. Gary's 
point was very interesting, that it's possible to become too comfortable 
with that relationship. I'm wondering whether there's any other 
profession that places such an emphasis on costume which isn't practical, 
which isn't to protect (e.g. from blood like a butcher's hat), which tell a 
story of their own and serve a function beyond the practicalities of 
protective clothing. Many actors say once they put on robes or once they 
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put on a crown, then it tells them how to how to speak. Stanislavski 
speaks of that. Instructing a young actor in An Actor Prepares (1936), he 
talks about taking the actor to the costume department and allowing the 
actor to find the character. Once they’ve found the costume, the 
character emerges from underneath. There is an element of truth that a 
costume brings with it some kind of inherent change or adjustment in 
behaviour. But on the other hand I am not convinced of the 
Stanislavskian notion that if you find the costume that it will then tell you 
how to perform and it will give you the character… 
GW: …There is a practical disciplining of the body that occurs sometimes 
through certain types of costume. Sometimes when we put on a suit – a 
suit is as much a legal costume as a gown – and cufflinks, or (for men) a 
tight tie, all of these things that we don't generally wear nowadays in 
general life, we’re wanting not just to project an image of how we appear 
outwardly but to project inwards on ourselves a conformity to a role. To 
get your shirt on and do the cuffs up is a disciplining of the body that has 
an effect on the mind. 
SM: Another dimension is the disciplining of the body in space and the 
role of the architecture of law plays in legal performance. We have spaces 
like courtrooms and parliament. If we take law away from those 
traditional buildings, how do you think that affects its performance? 
GW: Let's for the sake of argument say that law’s performance is always 
trying to persuade – persuade your client that you mean the best for 
them, persuade a witness that you will honour their account. If this is 
essentially what lawyers do, then I think that it can happen outside of 
traditional legal spaces. What we know more about is the traditional 
spaces. Linda Mulcahy (2011) and a number of other commentators have 
written about the operation of courtrooms and judicial spaces. They also 
point us towards some of those gateway or peripheral spaces such as the 
public waiting room to a court, the judicial chambers and the lawyers’ 
robing rooms. A comparison may be made to the foyer of the theatre, 
the wings and the green room – all those places that lead you into the 
actual auditorium. Those marginal spaces are the architectural equivalent 
of dress, a sort of border zone. What an actor does in the green room or 
what the lawyer does in the robing room is deeply intrinsic to the 
performance and law. These are spaces in which you gather yourself and 
constitute yourself in a new costume but also in a new frame of mind. 
SM: Felix, did you want to pick up on any of those points? You've had 
experiences of shooting on location in legal precincts and I'm interested in 
your views of what it was like to perform the lawyer's role in a court 
space. 
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FN: One thing that struck me when you say about filming in an actual 
courtroom [was] we filmed in the old Magistrates Court up by Russell 
Street opposite the police station, a fantastic sandstone building of 
Melbourne's history. Not many people have the opportunity to go into 
that; it’s been replaced in the meantime. It struck me that the reason 
nobody goes in there except to film the occasional television drama is 
because it's useful for nothing else. Here it is, prime real estate in the 
middle of Melbourne, and it's good for nothing when it's not serving the 
function for which it is designed. Richard Schechner (2003: 8-19) speaks 
about theatre and sport and religion and games having a number of 
things in common. One of the things is space. All these things have a 
building, they take up real estate usually in the middle of a city, which 
can do nothing else than what it does and is empty most of the time, but 
when it's being used people flock to it. Think of the law in relation to 
that. Legal buildings are often prime locations. Often they tend to be 
quite busy on the day for a certain trial but empty otherwise. A law court 
like a theatre is built with a specific purpose in mind. 
SM: Felix, you've written about the process of your warm-up routine 
before telling your story and how that is in itself a form of ‘private 
performance’ that affects the public performance and also the way that it 
is received by the audience (2010: 193). How do you think these routines 
that people undertake before telling stories affect the story and its 
reception? 
FN: There are probably two things that happen with that routine and 
they are counter to each other. One is to prepare the performer to get 
into a place where they are ready to deal with anything that comes their 
way. The other is to be in tune with the space itself so that they're able 
to respond to the realities of what's happening around them. There's 
something there in relation to the balance between truth and the 
‘performance of truth’. There's a process of trying to touch base with 
truth and reality within oneself without losing touch with the truth that's 
around oneself. It has to do with aligning the performer's reality with the 
reality around them but holding true to both of them and not allowing 
one to hold sway entirely over the other. It has to do with touching base 
with where a performance is happening geographically and whom the 
audiences is and trying to find their truth and trying to find the truth of 
the location and aligning that with the truth of the performer. 
SM: You talk about the process of going through an internal personal 
warm-up routine but then going off and chatting with others or going 
around and exploring the stage. You call this process a desire to ‘seek to 
reconnect with the real and the actual’ (2010: 189), which plays into this 
question again of truth. What do you think it is about going in and 
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grounding yourself in the space and having human interactions before 
going on stage that is real and actual to you? 
FN: Storytelling performance relies entirely on the ability to tell the story 
to the audience. It's easy to slip a little bit too far into being caught up 
with the performance itself. If that happens, you can still tell a convincing 
story and you can still get a good round of applause at the end, but it 
misses that point of adjusting to the audience. It has to do with 
reminding the performer who the audience is, what the story is being 
told, what the value is of the story, what the importance is of the story, 
why this is happening, what the purpose of it is. In the same way that – 
again, to draw in Schechner – before beginning a ritual it's important to 
remember what the purpose of that ritual is rather than simply go 
through the ritual. Simply going through a ritual brings its own rewards 
but reminding oneself why this is happening, why this is important, why 
this is of value [is critical]. 
SM: That brings me to the last question around what role the audience 
plays in performance and how the audience plays a constitutive role in 
performance. Gary, did you want to pick up on that idea from Felix 
around how a particular element of the preparatory process before going 
to speak is thinking about the audience? What role do you think the 
audience plays within legal performance and what constitutive role do 
you think they play? 
GW: Talking about live performance, I think audience is everything. When 
you're speaking to an actual live audience you have to have a sense of 
responsiveness, as Felix is saying, a sense of awareness of when the 
audience need to fidget or when you're losing them. It's essential to 
constituting your performance. How can it be that, a Shakespearean 
[play], a script that hasn't changed in 400 years and is often performed in 
repertoire for months on end, can produce a different performance day 
after day? Some performances are very palpably different to others. An 
actor will come off stage thinking that went badly, another time they 
think it went brilliantly. How? Why? A connection to the audience may 
be the biggest factor... If that's the case, then it just shows you how 
important it is, if lawyers are involved in any form of live performance, 
that they try to connect with the audience. Who is the audience for a 
lawyer is a nice question. For an advocate, more often than not their 
primary audience is the judge. or it may be a jury. A lawyer is also 
performing backwards to the people who are paying them. They want to 
be seen to be performing in a certain way. If a lawyer’s performance is 
backwards-facing to the client who is paying, then of course the audience 
constitutes the performance genuinely. The lawyer’s paying client is not 
like a theatrical audience who may have been tricked into paying for a 
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bad performance for one night only, a lawyer’s paying audience is very 
often a client who might withdraw their instruction or decide that they're 
not going to (in the case of the instructing solicitor) instruct this barrister 
again in the future. For lawyers – and here we go back to the very first 
thing that I said about the shield of Achilles as Homer describes it – 
you're performing for payment. That's a very crude way of reducing 
what's going on, but professional actors and professional lawyers, as 
opposed to my students who moot, are constituted in a very pragmatic 
way by the pressure to perform professionally. That may be paid 
pressure, it may be reputational pressure, it may be your own dignity in 
your role, which is a pressure that's placed on you by a professional 
sense of vocation. Whatever it is – and you can be your own audience, of 
course – without an audience there is no relevant performance. The 
audience is entirely constitutive of what the law does. What, we might 
conjecture, is the difference between a real trial and a moot trial in which 
the facts are realistic, the legal question is real, the legal authorities are 
real, the judge is a real judge who has kindly agreed to come and decide 
the issues, and the proceedings are even held in an actual court building? 
If everything is real apart from the sense that there is pressure to 
perform for a certain kind of stake-holding audience, then that stake-
holding audience is possibly what makes the difference between the real 
performance and the notional performance or, to put it another way, the 
difference between that which is real and socially-binding as opposed to 
that which is notional and playful. 
SM: There was a really salient point there around the idea of ‘without an 
audience there is no relevant performance.’ I might shift that over to 
Felix. Having performed both on film and television as well as in theatre, 
what role do you think the audience plays and does it play a constitutive 
role in performance? 
FN: In terms of what Gary said, I agree you can perform for yourself. But 
in terms of storytelling, it varies depending on the audience. What that 
then means is that the decisions that the performer makes depends on 
the audience. If we take a look at that in relation to law it suggests – I’ll 
avoid using the word truth because I appreciate that's a problematic 
notion – that what is right, just or fair depends on the audience. 
Ultimately that's where the truth is – that someone who's had a crime 
committed against them feels vindicated or feels they've been listened 
to. The truth of it lies amongst the people being served somehow by the 
system. But it occurs to me that theatre is a more truthful trade than law. 
In theatre it is possible to acknowledge that some things don't have 
answers and that some things won’t unfold in a certain way. Theatre 
delights in uncertainty and doubt. Theatre celebrates that while the law 
doesn't so much. The law is grappling toward some kind of proof until 
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eventually it gets to the point where something is found as proof. The 
audience is at the heart of it, but really at the heart of it is the people 
whose lives are being decided in these things. In theatre people's lives 
aren't changed. People are affected, but they aren't changed in the same 
way that they are in law. 
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